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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-2(j) (2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED & STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in concluding (i) that Jeanne Tolle was a creditor of 
Robert Tolle, and (ii) that Robert Tolle was insolvent at the time of the transfers. 
Resolution of these questions involves "both questions of law and of fact." Bradford 
v.Bradford. 1999 UT App 373, f 10,993 P.2d 887. The court's findings of fact are reviewed 
for clear error, while the trial court's "conclusions as to the legal effect of a given set of 
found facts" are reviewed for correctness. Id. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in finding that Robert Tolle had actual intent to 
defraud Jeanne Tolle. 
The question of whether a transferor had fraudulent intent is "ordinarily considered 
a question of fact." IcL at f 18; see also Territorial Savings & Loan Assoc, v. Baird, 781 P.2d 
452, 462 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Questions of fact are reviewed for clear error. Bradford, 
1999 UT App 373 at f 10. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
i 
1. Jeanne Tolle was born in 195 8, and is the natural daughter of Robert Tolle. Findings 
ofFactatfl. From 1958until 1970, Jeanne Tolle lived with Robert Tolle in Florida. 
Findings of Fact at fflfl-3.1 
]Though the Fenleys have challenged several factual findings that were entered by the 
trial court, they have not in any way complied with-or even attempted to comply with-the 
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2. After Jeanne Tolle entered the second grade, Robert Tolle physically and emotionally 
abused Jeanne Tolle. Findings of Fact at %2. This abuse included Robert Tolle 
repeatedly rape Jeanne Tolle over a period of several years. Findings of Fact at [^2. 
3. Robert Tolle eventually separated from Jeanne Tolle's mother and moved from 
Florida to Ohio in 1970. Findings of Fact at «p. In 1973, Jeanne Tolle was sent to 
live with her father in Ohio. Robert Tolle began raping Jeanne Tolle again upon her 
arrival in Ohio. Findings of Fact at ^|4. 
4. In 1973, Jeanne Tolle finally told her mother about the abuse. Findings of Fact at %5. 
At that point, Jeanne returned to Florida to again live with her mother, and finally 
reported the rapes to Florida authorities. Findings of Fact at [^6. Robert Tolle then 
fled from Ohio, however, and Florida officials were unable to arrest Robert Tolle at 
that time. Findings of Fact at *|7. 
5. Jeanne Tolle lost track of her father in 1973 and did not know where he lived until 
2001. Findings of Fact at 1J9. 
6. In October 2001, Jeanne Tolle was called by a cousin of hers who was in Florida on 
marshaling requirement set forth in Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9). It is well 
established in Utah that an appellate court is required to assume that the factual findings of the 
trial court are correct in the absence of a valid, marshaling-supported challenge. In Houghton v. 
Miller, 2005 UT App 303, - P.3d -, for example, this Court expressly "adopted the trial court's 
findings because Defendant has failed to marshal the evidence in support of those findings." IcL 
at 11 n.2; see also Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998); Johnson v. Higlev. 
1999 UT App 278, f37, 989 P.2d 61. 
Given the failure to marshal in this case, this Court is therefore required to accept those 
Findings of Fact as true. As such, all references in this brief will therefore be to the trial court's 
Findings of Facts, located in the appellate record at R. 165. 
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business. Findings of Fact at ^10. Through that conversation, Jeanne learned that 
Robert Tolle had been living in Utah for the past 14 years. Findings of Fact at TJ10. 
Subsequent to that conversation, Jeanne contacted Ralph Tolle, Robert's brother. 
Findings of Fact at f 11. In that conversation, Jeanne Tolle told Ralph Tolle that 
Robert Tolle had raped her as a child. Findings of Fact at f 11. Jeanne also told Ralph 
that she intended to "take away Robert's possessions" for what he had done to her. 
Findings of Fact at f 11. 
Jeanne Tolle also contacted Mary Dagmar Fenley, Robert Tolle's ex-wife. Findings 
of Fact at f 12. During that conversation, Jeanne Tolle told Fenley about the rapes, 
and also told Fenley that she intended to take Robert Tolle's possessions away from 
him for what he had done to her. Findings of Fact at ^[13. 
In October 2001, Jeanne Tolle made telephone contact with Robert Tolle. Findings 
of Fact at % 15. In a taped call, Robert Tolle acknowledged having repeatedly raped 
Jeanne Tolle while she was a child. Findings of Fact at f 15. Robert Tolle blamed his 
behavior on the fact that Jeanne Tolle's mother had not been "taking care of him." 
Findings of Fact at ^ 15. 
During that phone call, Robert Tolle expressed remorse for having raped Jeanne while 
she was a child, and then requested that Jeanne Tolle come visit him in Utah. 
Findings of Fact at f 15. 
Jeanne Tolle visited Robert Tolle in Utah in the fall of 2001. Findings of Fact at f 18. 
Page 3 of 20 
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While there, Robert Tolle placed Jeanne's name on some joint bank accounts. 
Findings of Fact at ^18. 
12. On November 30, 2001, Robert Tolle was arrested for the rapes of Jeanne Tolle. 
Findings of Fact at f22. As he was being arrested, he phoned Jeanne Tolle and told 
her that he knew that "she was responsible" for the arrest. Findings of Fact at <fl22. 
13. On December 1, 2001, Jeanne Tolle informed Juan and Sherry Hernandez2 that she 
intended to take Robert Tolle's possessions away for what he did to her. Findings of 
Fact at 1(23. 
14. "In the days and weeks following Robert's incarceration, the defendants, Fenley, 
Hernandez, and [Ralph] Tolle, wrote letters to Robert indicating an interest in 
protecting Robert's property from Jeanne." Findings of Fact at ^|25. 
15. OnDecember 5,2001, Ralph Tolle traveled to Utah. Findings of Fact at J30. Onhis 
way, he picked up a set of deeds for the properties that Robert Tolle owned and took 
them to Robert Tolle in the Millard County Jail. Findings of Fact at ^30. These 
properties included a 200 acre ranch and a five bedroom house in Hinckley, as well 
as a two bedroom home in Delta. Findings of Fact at ^ [16. 
16. While at the Millard County jail, Robert Tolle deeded over all of these properties to 
Ralph Tolle and Mary Dagmar Fenley. Findings of Fact at f30. These transactions 
2Juan and Sherry Hernandez are confidants of Robert Tolle's who at one time also 
claimed an interest in some of the properties in dispute in this case. They have not appealed the 
verdicts. 
Page 4 of 20 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
occurred only five days after his arrest, and constituted "all the property known to be 
held in Robert Tolle's name." Findings of Fact at ^30. 
17. As the result ofthese transfers, Robert Tolle was rendered insolvent. Findings of Fact 
at1J31. 
18. Robert Tolle was extradited to Florida. He died awaiting trial on June 11, 2002. 
Findings of Fact at <f39. 
19. Jeanne Tolle filed a civil suit against Robert Tolle in Florida in February 2002. 
Findings of Fact at f38. On September 24, 2004, Jeanne Tolle received a judgment 
in the amount of $1, 704,610.75. Findings of Fact at f38. That judgment has been 
domesticated in Utah. Findings of Fact at f38. 
20. On March 26, 2003, Jeanne Tolle filed suit in Utah asking that Robert Tolle's 
transfers of property be voided under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. R. at 1. 
21. On October 7, 2004, a trial was held regarding Jeanne Tolle's Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act claims. R. at 109. 
22. On November 8,2004, the trial court entered its ruling, wherein it determined that the 
December 2001 transfers were fraudulent. As such, the court voided the transfers and 
returned the properties to Robert Tolle's estate. R. at 165. 
23. Mary Dagmar Fenley and John Fenley now appeal. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Fenleys argue that the trial court erred by determining that Jeanne Tolle was a 
Page 5 of 20 
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creditor of Robert Tolle at the time of the transfers. The trial court's ruling on this point was 
correct, however, because (i) the Florida judgment does constitute a debt under Utah law, and 
(ii) settled Utah law establishes that a threat of suit is sufficient to invoke the protections of 
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act. 
The Fenleys next argue that the trial court erred in finding that Robert Tolle was 
insolvent at the time of the transfers. The Fenleys ignore the fact that Robert Tolle had a 
claim against him stemming from the Florida rapes, however, thus constituting a valid debt 
for purposes of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. Contrary to the Fenleys' assertions, 
the fact that Robert Tolle was in prison at the time of the transfers does not change this result. 
Finally, the Fenleys argue that the evidence does not support the finding that Robert 
Tolle had actual intent to defraud Jeanne Tolle. The Fenleys have conceded that Robert 
Tolle transferred all of his properties for no consideration, however, thus supporting the trial 
court's conclusion on this point. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT JEANNE TOLLE WAS 
A CREDITOR OF ROBERT TOLLE. 
Under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, a "creditor" is defined as "a person who 
has a claim." Utah Code Annotated § 25-6-2(4) (2004). Under §25-6-2(3), a "claim" 
"means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, 
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured " The trial court below concluded 
that Jeanne Tolle was a creditor of Robert Tolle at the time that he transferred his properties 
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based on the fact that she had threatened him with suit for repeatedly raping her as a child. 
As noted by the trial court, Jeanne Tolle did eventually file civil suit against him in Florida, 
and ultimately obtained a judgment against him for over one million dollars. 
The Fenleys argue that this conclusion was in error. According to the Fenleys, the 
Florida lawsuit could not be considered as a "debt" of Robert Tolle for purposes of the 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act because (1) the statute of limitations on the Florida action 
had allegedly run before the Florida complaint was filed, and (2) the Florida judgment was 
obtained after the properties had already been transferred. Both arguments should be 
rejected. 
1. This Court should reject the Fenleys' attempt to collaterally attack the 
Florida judgment in this appeal. 
First, the Fenleys' attempt to collaterally attack the Florida civil judgment in this 
appeal is not properly raised and should be rejected. The Fenleys have failed to identify any 
place where this argument was preserved or ruled on in the Utah court below, and they have 
also failed to provide any citations to the Florida litigation that would shed light on the 
statute of limitations issue as it was advanced there. As a result, it is difficult to fully address 
or even understand this argument, insofar as it is unclear whether this Court is: (1) being 
asked to collaterally review a statute of limitations ruling from Florida; (2) review the Utah 
trial court's decision on whether an actual ruling on this issue by a Florida court has any 
bearing on the fraudulent transfer action here; (3) review the Utah trial court's ruling 
regarding what a Florida court would have done if the statute of limitations argument had 
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been properly raised there; or (4) review the potential Florida statute of limitations issue for 
the first time in this proceeding. "Issues that are not raised at trial are usually deemed 
waived." DLB Collection Trust v. Harris. 893 P.2d 593, 595 (Utah Ct App. 1995). Here, 
the Fenleys have failed to identify whether a ruling has been issued on this question below 
or even where in the record this issue was raised. For this reason alone, this attempt to raise 
this issue now should be rejected.3 
Even if this Court indulges the Fenleys' request to review the Florida statute of 
limitations issue, the record actually indicates that there would have been no statute of 
limitations problem at all. While the Fenleys do set up and defeat the straw man argument 
relating to the tolling of statutes of limitations for minors, the Fenleys then neglect to point 
out that there are other, more applicable statute of limitations defenses that would have also 
3Assuming for a moment that there is a ruling from a Florida court on this issue, the 
Fenleys' attempt to have this Court review that ruling now would be improper. 
It is well accepted in Utah that collateral attacks on prior judgments from prior courts are 
disfavored. "With rare exception, when a court with proper jurisdiction enters a final judgment, 
including a default judgment, that judgment can only be attacked on direct appeal." State v. 
Hamilton. 2003 UT 22, ^ 25, 70 P.3d 111 (quoting Olsen v. Bd. of Ed.. 571 P.2d 1336, 1338 
(Utah 1997)). In Collins v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment. 2002 UT 77, 52 P.3d 1267, the 
Supreme Court noted that "the interest of the state requires that there be an end to litigation-a 
maxim which comports with common sense as well as public policy." IcL at ^ [19. The Court 
thus held that "an erroneous conclusion reached by the court in the first suit does not deprive the 
defendants in the second action of their right to rely upon the plea of res judicata. A judgment 
merely voidable because based upon an erroneous view of the law is not open to collateral attack, 
but can be corrected by a direct review and not by bringing another action upon the same cause of 
action." Id. at f 18; see also Commercial Investment Corp. v. Siggard. 936P.2d 1105, 1110 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997); Morgan v. Morgan. 875 P.2d 563, 565-66 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Here, the proper place for an assault on the Florida judgment would be on direct review in 
Florida, not in a corollary attack filed in an appeal from a Utah probate action. 
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applied to this case. The most obvious of these would be Florida Statutes Annotated 
§95.051(l)(a) (2005), which would have tolled the statute of limitations during the entire 
time that Robert Tolle was in Ohio and Utah. According to the trial court's factual findings 
below, Robert Tolle left Florida in 1970 and presumably didn't return until his extradition 
in 2001. Under Florida Statutes Annotated §95.05 l(l)(a) (2005), the statute of limitations 
would therefore have been tolled until 2001. Given that Jeanne Tolle filed suit within four 
years of his extradition, there would have been no statute of limitations problem at all.4 
Regardless, the Fenleys have failed to even point to a place where any of these 
arguments have been ruled on. As such, any discussion of these potential defenses is 
grounded in speculation on what a lower court may have determined, not on what a lower 
court did determine, and is therefore simply not subject to appellate review. Because the 
Fenleys have not cited this Court to any court that addressed the Florida statute of limitations 
below, this Court should simply reject this argument. 
2. Jeanne Tolle was a creditor for purposes of the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfers Act because she had threatened suit against Robert Tolle. 
Second, the fact that the Florida judgment was entered after the transfers had occurred 
is irrelevant for purposes of the fraudulent transfer act. As noted above, § 25-6-2(3) defines 
a claim as "a right to payment." In Bradford v. Bradford. 1999 UT App 373, 993 P.2d 887, 
this Court considered a case where the transferee was similarly arguing that the challenged 
4Other limitations would also have been potentially applicable, including the common 
law discovery rule, and Florida Statutes Ann. §95.10, which would have tolled the statute of 
limitations in Florida based on any Ohio or Utah-based defenses. 
i 
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transfer was not voidable because it had occurred prior to the actual filing of the suit. Id. at 
ffi[l 3-16. This Court rejected that argument, therein holding that "a person in the position of 
plaintiff is protected under the act, icL at ^|15, even if the person has merely "threatened" 
suit at the time that the transfers actually occur. Id at ^ [16 (emphasis added). This result is 
consistent with the opinions of other courts and commentators that have examined this issue. 
See, e.g.. United States v. Green, 201 F.3d 251, 257 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that mere 
"awareness of a probable legal action against a debtor amounts to a debt" for purposes of the 
fraudulent transfer act); 37 AmJur.2d Fraudulent Conveyances and Transfers §3 (2005) 
("The existence of a debt is a requirement for bringing a fraudulent conveyance action and 
generally speaking, the awareness of probable legal action against a debtor amounts to a 
debt."). 
In their brief, the Fenleys appear to acknowledge this authority, but still argue that 
there must be "some limit" on the reaches of the fraudulent transfer act. This concern is 
misplaced. As indicated by this Court in Bradford, the statute must be liberally construed in 
order "to reach all artifices and evasions designed to rob the Act of its full force and effect." 
1999 UT App 373 at «|16 (quoting Butler v. Wilkinson. 740 P.2d 1244, 1260 (Utah 1987)). 
This Court further noted that "all statutes made against fraud should be liberally and 
beneficially expounded to suppress the fraud." Id, (quoting Givan v. Lambeth. 351 P.2d 959 
(Utah I960)). If there is to be a limitation on the applicability of the fraudulent transfers act, 
that limitation is the practical one that is imposed by the burden of proof that the plaintiff 
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bears in any particular case. The simple fact that a plaintiffs claim has not had time to work 
its way through the system, however, should not act as a loophole that would allow an 
erstwhile defendant to make himself insolvent by transferring away all of his or her assets. 
Here, the court's finding that Robert Tolle admitted to having repeatedly raped Jeanne 
Tolle while she was a young child has not been challenged. It has also not been challenged 
that, after locating Robert Tolle several decades later, Jeanne Tolle then told his brother, ex-
wife, and confidants of her plans to take all of his property. Finally, it has also not been 
challenged that, shortly after being arrested, Robert Tolle's brother, ex-wife, and confidants 
all wrote to Robert Tolle and asked him to transfer his properties out of his name in order to 
keep them from Jeanne Tolle, and that Robert Tolle then complied with those requests by 
deeding over those properties within a week of his arrest. By responding so clearly, so 
quickly after the arrest, Robert Tolle implicitly acknowledged that Jeanne was a potential 
plaintiff against him and that she would potentially be filing suit. Transferring properties as 
a means of avoiding actual debts is prohibited by the act, and transferring properties as a 
means of avoiding potential debts is also prohibited by the act. As such, Jeanne Tolle was 
properly deemed to have been Robert Tolle's creditor.5 
Page 11 of 20 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT ROBERT TOLLE WAS 
INSOLVENT AT THE TIME OF THE TRANSFERS. 
The Fenleys next argue that the trial court erred in concluding that Robert Tolle was 
insolvent at the time that the transfers occurred. As noted by the Fenleys, Utah Code 
Annotated §25-6-5(2)(i) and §25-6-6(1 )(b) both allow a court to find that a transfer was 
fraudulent based, in part, on the insolvency of the transferor. The trial court below 
determined that Robert Tolle was insolvent at the time of the transfers, and then used that 
conclusion as partial support for its decision to void the transfers. 
In arguing that Robert Tolle was not insolvent at the time of the transfers, the Fenleys 
first assert that, "at the time of the transfer at issue, Robert Tolle was essentially debt free." 
Appellant's Brief at 17. In addition to failing to support this assertion with any evidence 
from the record, this argument also wholly fails to account for the fact that Jeanne Tolle had 
already threatened suit against Robert Tolle for repeatedly raping her at the time that the 
transfers were made. "Insolvency may be measured not merely at the time of transfer, but 
also at the time plaintiff seeks to collect the amount due." 37 Am.Jur.2d Fraudulent 
Conveyances and Transfers §19 (2005). As was discussed above, threats of suit are deemed 
superfluous as well. Suppose, for example, that the Florida court in 2004 had finally considered 
the statute of limitations issue raised above and had then ruled that the suit was barred on those 
grounds. That conclusion still wouldn't change the fact that, in 2001, Robert Tolle transferred 
the properties in anticipation of a lawsuit that he had reason to believe was coming. This intent 
to hide properties from an expected tortfeasor is clearly the basis for deeming the transfers to be 
fraudulent acts. As such, even if this Court were to determine that the Florida statute of 
limitations argument has some merit, this Court can and still should conclude that it does not 
have any bearing on this case. Again, there was a threat of suit, and Robert Tolle responded to 
the threat of suit by hiding assets. The ultimate success of that suit is simply not at issue. 
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to be "debts" for purposes of the fraudulent transfer act. See Utah Code Annotated § 25-6-
2(3), (5) (defining a debt as a "liability on a claim" and a claim as "a right to payment, 
whether or not the right is reduced to judgment...[or is] unliquidated"). Thus, insofar as 
Jeanne Tolle's suit against Robert Tolle ultimately resulted in a judgment of over one million 
dollars, Robert Tolle actually had "debts" of over one million dollars at the time that the 
transfers were made. The conclusion that Robert Tolle was insolvent was therefore correct. 
The Fenleys next argue that Robert Tolle could not be deemed insolvent at the time 
of the transfers by virtue of the fact that he was in prison. According to the Fenleys, the fact 
that his "physical needs were being met, if meagerly, by the facility in which he was 
incarcerated" is enough to render him solvent for purposes of the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act. In addition to being unsupported by any reference to any authority, this 
argument can and should be rejected on two additional levels. First, the prison-based 
argument advanced by the Fenleys has little to do with the test for insolvency that is set forth 
in Utah Code Annotated §25-6-3(1). Under that statute, "insolvency" for purposes of the 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act is defined by a person's debt-ratio, not whether they have 
access to food and water. Thus, the fact that Robert Tolle was being cared for while in 
prison has little direct relevance at all to the particular question of whether he was insolvent 
for purposes of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act. 
On a more fundamental level, however, this particular argument can and should be 
rejected because it is flagrantly violative of the scope and purposes for which the Uniform 
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Fraudulent Transfers Act has been enacted. "Although one can generally dispose of his 
property as he sees fit, one cannot frustrate his creditor's rights and avoid his obligations by 
changing title to his assets. That is the point of fraudulent conveyance law." 37 Am.Jur. 2d 
Fraudulent Conveyances and Transfers §1 (2005). Taken on its literal terms, the Fenleys' 
argument is that while law-abiding citizens are not allowed to fraudulently transfer their 
properties, an exception should be created giving criminals that very right. If this Court 
were to accept this argument, this Court would create the perverse scenario in which being 
sent to prison would aid a debtor's efforts to hide assets from his or her lawful creditors. 
Imprisonment should not be an asset for the tortfeasor, and the walls of the prison 
should not act as a shelter from the reaches of the fraudulent transfer act. Robert Tolle was 
in jail because he had admitted to raping Jeanne Tolle while she was a young girl. The 
criminality of his conduct simply should not be converted into a tool that would allow the 
Fenleys to retain properties that should instead be used to satisfy Robert Tolle's civil debts 
to Jeanne Tolle. This argument should be rejected. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT ROBERT TOLLE HAD 
ACTUAL INTENT TO DEFRAUD JEANNE TOLLE. 
Finally, the Fenleys argue that the trial court erred in finding that Robert Tolle had 
"actual intent" to defraud Jeanne Tolle when he transferred the properties. This argument 
should be rejected.6 
6In point I of their brief, the Fenleys also argue that the trial court erred by (i) ruling that 
they had "conceded" that the transfer of the Hinckley property was fraudulent, and (ii) by then 
failing to enter any conclusions of law regarding that particular transfer. 
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The question of whether a transferor had fraudulent intent is "ordinarily considered 
a question of fact." Bradford, 1999 UT App 373 at f 18; see also Territorial Savings & Loan 
Assoc, v. Baird. 781 P.2d 452, 462 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). When challenging a ruling on a 
question of fact, an appellant must first marshal the evidence in support of that ruling. Utah 
R. App. P. 24(a)(9). "Where a party fails to . . . marshal the evidence, we need not consider 
the challenge to the sufficiency of the findings." Houghton v. Miller. 2005 UT App 303, f 1 
n.2, - P.3d - . For this reason alone, these findings should be accepted by this Court. 
Even if this Court chooses to address the merits of the challenge, it is still clear that 
the Fenleys have not carried their burden on appeal. Under Utah Code Annotated § 25-6-
5(2)(a)-(k), a trial court is empowered to determine that the debtor had "actual intent" to 
defraud the creditor by relying on any of eleven separately numbered factors. These factors 
have been referred to in the Utah cases as the "indicia" or "badges of fraud." Territorial 
Savings & Loan Assoc. 781 P.2d at 462: accord Dahnken. Inc. v. Wilmartbu 726 P.2d 420, 
423 (Utah 1086). "Badges of fraud are said to be facts which throw suspicion on a 
transaction, and which call for an explanation. More simply stated, they are signs or marks 
On page 10 of its Ruling, however, the trial court did enter specific conclusions of law 
regarding the transfer of the Hinckley properties. In that Ruling, the Court determined that 
Robert Tolle transferred the Hinckley property "with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud" 
Jeanne Tolle, and then went on to conclude that the specific statutory requirements for the 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act had been met with respect to that particular transfer. Id. The 
Fenleys' challenge to the substance of these particular conclusions is in fact the basis for point IV 
of their brief. As such, the argument that the trial court erred by failing to enter appropriate 
findings is simply incorrect and should be rejected. 
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of fraud. They do not of themselves or per se constitute fraud, but they are facts having a 
tendency to show the existence of fraud." Territorial Savings & Loan Assoc, 781 P.2d at 
462. Thus, by relying on these indicia of fraud, a trial court is able to determine that a party 
had actual fraudulent intent "by way of inference or presumption." 37 Am. Jur.2d Fraudulent 
Conveyances and Transfers §10. 
The Fenleys correctly note that the trial court relied on five separate indicia of fraud 
in concluding that Robert Tolle had actual intent to defraud Jeannie Tolle. Specifically, the 
trial court concluded that (i) the transfers were to insiders, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§ 25-6-5(2)(a); (ii) Robert Tolle "retained control over the property after the transfer," 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 25-6-5(2)(b); (iii) Robert Tolle had been threatened with 
suit prior to the transfer, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 25-6-5(2)(d); (iv) the transfer 
consisted of "all or substantially all of the debtor's assets," pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§ 25-6-5(2)(e); and (v) "there was no consideration for the transfer," pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 25-6-5(2)(h). 
While the Fenleys have mounted individual challenges to the first three of these 
indicia, the Fenleys also concede that the findings regarding the fourth indicium (ie that 
Robert Tolle transferred all or substantially all of his assets) and fifth indicium (that Robert 
Tolle received no consideration) are substantively correct. See Appellant's Brief at 20.7 In 
7Even if the Fenleys hadn't conceded the substantive truth of these conclusions, this Court 
would be bound to reject any challenge based on their failure to offer any contrary evidence. The 
Fenleys have failed, for example, to establish that Robert Tolle kept any property in his name, 
and they have also failed to identify any consideration, let alone adequate consideration, that he 
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Territorial Savings & Loan Assoc, this Court noted that "a single one" of the indicia of fraud 
can be sufficient to support a court's finding of fraudulent intent. 781 P.2d at 462. Thus, on 
a clear-error review, the Fenleys' failure to challenge the substance of either the fourth or 
fifth indicia of fraud cited above is fatal to their claim that the trial court lacked support for 
its fraudulent intent finding.8 
received in return for these transfers. 
8While conceding that the transfers included substantially all of Robert Tolle's property 
and were effected for no consideration, the Fenleys also argue that this should not matter because 
the transfers were allegedly made as part of a will. This argument fails on multiple levels. 
First, the Fenleys cite to no provision in the fraudulent transfers act which makes any 
exception for wills. Though the act does specifically address its applicability to transfers to 
trusts, for example, see Utah Code Annotated § 25-6-14 (2005), there is no similar provision 
relating to wills. Given the absence of any authority for this argument, this Court should not 
accept the Fenleys' invitation to now create such an exception in the absence of any statutory or 
precedential authority. 
Second, allowing debtors to avoid their creditors by transferring all of their assets in a 
will violates the entire purpose of the fraudulent transfer act. As noted above, this act is 
construed "broadly" in order "to reach all artifices and evasions designed to rob the Act of its full 
force and effect." Bradford, 1999 UT App 373 at Tfl6. There is simply no coherent reason why 
debtors should be able to use their own terminal illness as a justification for cheating their 
creditors out of their assets. As with the prison-based argument discussed above, the Fenleys' 
attempt to now allow terminal ill persons to fraudulently convey their properties is offensive to 
the spirit, scope, and purpose of the fraudulent transfer act, and should not be countenanced. 
Third, the probate hearing that the Fenleys cite to as "proof that the transfers occurred as 
part of a will was held in January 2003-over three months prior to Jeanne Tolle filing her civil 
claim in Florida, and over a year and half prior to the trial that was held regarding Jeanne Tolle's 
fraudulent conveyance claim. The transcript of this hearing doesn't even appear in the appellate 
record for this proceeding, but is attached to this Brief as Attachment A. There are a number of 
points that are significant. First, this hearing was held in the absence of any representation by 
anyone on behalf of Jeanne Tolle. Attachment A at 2. Second, at this hearing, the trial court 
expressly noted that the "will" that the Fenleys are now relying on was prepared by Robert Tolle 
while he was in the Millard County Jail awaiting extradition to Florida on charges of having 
raped Jeanne Tolle. Attachment A at 8. Under the terms of the fraudulent transfer act, this will 
would also properly be deemed to be a fraudulent conveyance. Third, the Fenleys conveniently 
neglect to point out that this same Court then issued another ruling on the probate matter on 
December 9, 2004, after the fraudulent conveyances had been set aside. See Attachment B. In 
Page 17 of 20 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In addition to the concessions on the fourth and fifth indicia, the Fenleys' recitation 
of the facts surrounding the third indicium of fraud (that Robert Tolle had been threatened 
with suit prior to the transfers) are simply incorrect. According to the Fenleys, there was 
"nothing in the record that Robert Tolle knew of any" threat of suit at the time of the 
transfers, and "the events leading to the charges" "were so remote" from the transfers that 
there was little probative value. 
As indicated above, however, at the time that the transfers were made, Jeanne Tolle 
had already told Robert Tolle's brother, ex-wife, and live-in confidants that she intended to 
take all of his property. Shortly after telling them this, Robert Tolle was arrested. "As he 
was being arrested, he called Jeanne, told her that he was being arrested and that he knew she 
was responsible." Findings of Fact at ^ [22. Then, within one week of the arrest, Robert Tolle 
asked his brother to travel to Utah, pick up the deeds to the properties, and bring them to him 
in the Millard County Jail. Findings of Fact at ^29-30. It was at this subsequent meeting 
that Robert Tolle transferred the properties out of his name. 
Given these circumstances, the Fenleys' assertions that the trial court did not have a 
basis on which to conclude that Robert Fenley knew about Jeanne's potential suit at the time 
of the transfers are simply untenable. Instead, the evidence clearly supports the trial court's 
that hearing, the trial court expressly acknowledged that the fraudulent transfers had in fact been 
set aside and that Jeanne Tolle was now the personal representative of the estate, Attachment B 
at 10-13, thus nullifying any probative effect that the January 2003 hearing might have otherwise 
had. 
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conclusion that the transfers were made in response to threats of suit. 
When challenging a finding of fact, an appellant must show that the trial court 
committed "clear error." The Fenleys have not shown that the trial court was clearly 
erroneous in concluding that Robert Tolle had been threatened with suit prior to the transfers, 
that he transferred all or substantially all of his assets, or that he did not receive any 
consideration in return for the transfers. As such, the findings are properly supported and 
should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
In spite of the fact that transfers in this case occurred within a week of Robert Tolle's 
arrest for raping Jeanne Tolle, the Fenleys now want this Court to conclude that the transfers 
were not fraudulent and were not designed to hide assets from Jeanne Tolle's lawful claims. 
As support for this request, the Fenleys rely on unsupported factual challenges and 
unsupported legal assertions. They also rely on the argument that criminals and terminally 
ill debtors should be given rights under the Uniformed Transfers Act that healthy, law-
abiding persons don't currently enjoy. These arguments are untenable and should be rejected 
by this Court. 
DATED this ($ day of July, 2005. 
and 
RYAN D. TENNEY, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 
(January 9, 2003) 
THE JUDGE: Okay. We'll call the case of the 
matter of the estate of Robert L. Tolle. Anyone appearing 
on that matter? 
MS. FENLEY: Yes. 
THE JUDGE: This is before the Court on the 
petition of Mary Dagmar Fenley to be appointed as personal 
representative over the estate of Robert L. Tolle. 
MS. FENLEY: Yes. 
THE JUDGE: Ms. Fenley is here. 
MS. FENLEY: Right here... 
THE JUDGE: Okay. You are? 
MS. PLUFF: Priscilla Pluff. 
THE JUDGE: And remind me what your interest in 
the estate. 
MS. PLUFF: I'm one of Robert's daughters. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. And you're objecting to the 
appointment of Ms. Fenley as the personal representative. Is 
that correct? 
MS. PLUFF: Yes. 
THE JUDGE: And what's the basis for that? Why 
are you objecting? 
MS. PLUFF: She don't think it's right. It's not 
right. 
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THE JUDGE: Again you are Priscilla. Is that 
Priscilla York? 
MS. PLUFF: Pluff. 
THE JUDGE: How do you spell your last name? 
MS. PLUFF: P-L-U-F as in Frank, F as in Frank. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. And you live in a— 
MS. PLUFF: Georgia. 
THE JUDGE: Georgia. Okay. 
Well, Ms. Fenley, my recollection is you're an 
ex-wife of Mr. Tolle. Is that correct? 
MS. FENLEY: Yes. 
THE JUDGE: Normally children would have priority 
with respect to the a, to be appointed as a personal 
representative over, over a person's estate unless that 
person, unless an ex, in your case ex-wife was designated as 
the personal representative in a Will. 
Why do you think that you have, would, should have 
priority over Ms., Ms. Pluff? 
MS. FENLEY: Well, it was this last sister that 
put Bob in jail and cleared out his bank account and took as 
much as she could before she had him put in jail. 
THE JUDGE: Well— 
MS. FENLEY: And when he wrote that Will out, do 
you have a copy of the Will? 
THE JUDGE: I do. 
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MS. FENLEY: Yes. When he wrote out that Will he 
had not been in touch with his two younger daughters. We had 
tried to find them. And the older daughter, the one that put 
him in jail told him that they had gone to Chicago and were 
married to some black men and didn't know the last names and 
so we never could find them. So the Will states only for 
his personal property and— 
THE JUDGE: Do you know, well— 
MS. FENLEY: — there's maybe— 
THE JUDGE: How much property are we talking 
about? 
MS. FENLEY: If you sold everything and got good 
prices maybe 15,000. There's a '92 Lincoln, an '88 Chevy 
S-10, a house full of furniture, two swamp coolers and a, two 
flat bed trailers. That's it. Oh, and a coin collection 
which his brother is holding until— 
THE JUDGE: Where is all this property located? 
MS. FENLEY: At Hinkley. 
THE JUDGE: It's my, my understanding that 
Mr. Tolle died in Florida. Is that correct? 
MS. FENLEY: Yes, June 11th they pulled the 
plug. He had emphysema and was in the prison hospital. 
THE JUDGE: He didn't have any personal, any real 
property left that he owned? 
MS. FENLEY: No. 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
THE JUDGE: All the property that was in Utah 
County that he'd owned previously had been sold or 
transferred to you or— 
MS. FENLEY: Yes. I mortgaged my house and a, we 
figured up our equities and paid him off and he gave me the, 
the, the deeds to the properties. I had to refinance 
everything in order to get him paid off and get his name off 
of all of the properties. 
Now his older daughter put an article in the paper 
in Florida when he first got there that was just scandalous 
and she also— 
THE JUDGE: Well I don't, I don't want to deal 
with those things, that— 
MS. FENLEY: Yes. But she also is under the 
impression that he had over 70 properties in Utah County and 
he certainly didn't. 
THE JUDGE: Well, I know that you had some 
properties because— 
MS. FENLEY: Yes. 
THE JUDGE: — ; I dealt with you and Mr. Tolle on 
some landlord tenant disputes and other things up in Utah 
County. But it's your representation that all of those 
properties have been sold? 
MS. FENLEY: No. They have been refinanced and 
they're in my name. 
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THE JUDGE: Refinanced and they're, and they're in 
your name only? 
MS. FENLEY: No. Mine and my son's. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MS. FENLEY: Who is no relation to Robert Tolle. 
THE JUDGE: Right. Ms. Pluff, what do you want 
the Court to do? 
MS. PLUFF: Well, I'm not the only one. This is 
another one of his daughters, my sister. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. And your name is? 
MS. GARCIA: Christina Aquino-Garcia. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. And where do you live? 
MS. GARCIA: Richmond, Indiana. 
THE JUDGE: So you live in Indiana and you live.in 
Georgia. 
Ms. Fenley? 
MS. FENLEY: Your Honor, I have never met the 
girls. Bob was in jail in Florida when we finally got 
contact. And they had found his name on the internet and 
called me so I've talked to them I think maybe five times, 
six times on the phone. 
THE JUDGE: Well, since there's just the three of 
you that a, are here contesting, it doesn't seem to me that 
we're talking about too much value, have the three of you, do 
you think it would help if the three of you went in the 
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conference room and discussed how you might want to resolve 
this? Ms. Garcia? 
MS. GARCIA: From my understanding his original 
Will is that his brother Eugene had half and Mary had half. 
THE JUDGE: Well I don't, the only Will I have is, 
and there's a copy in the file, that he made out a, it's a 
handwritten what we call an alographic (phonetic) Will which 
he made out while he was in jail here at the Millard County 
Jail awaiting extradition back to Florida wherein he, and 
it's dated December 12 of 2001, and he in it says he gives 
all of his personal property to a, Mary Dagmar Fenley. If 
you have another Will that you want to present— 
MS. GARCIA?: At that time we didn't even know 
where he was. Jeanne's lawyer that was here last had a copy 
of that Will but I never received one. 
THE JUDGE: Well, she's not, her attorney is not 
here now? 
MS. GARCIA?: I think she fired him. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. And she's not, doesn't have 
any interest now? 
MS. GARCIA?: NO. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Well, do you think, and what my 
suggestion is is do you think it would be helpful if the 
three of you just went and met and talked and see if you can 
resolve any issues? Okay. Why don't the, why don't the 
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three of you go, there's conference rooms back out here, sit 
and talk. And, and it looks like Ms. Fenley is aware of what 
the, what the assets are that remain. 
One thing I would require you normally is that 
since there's a contest that we, that there be an inventory 
made of what's included in that property and that then there 
would be a determination as to who has the right to receive 
the proceeds of the estate and, and how, how that was to 
occur. Okay? 
MALE SPEAKER: It's my understanding that the 
executor is supposed to a, see that what's stated in the Will 
is done correctly. Correct? 
THE JUDGE: Yes. I think they're also maybe 
contesting that this is not a last Will and Testament. 
MALE SPEAKER: Those would be two separate issues 
then. Okay. 
THE JUDGE: There are two issues. One is who is 
to, who is to be his personal representative. Whether it's 
going to be, I assume it would be one of the three of you. 
And a, and how, what the, what the value of the estate is, 
what the, what the property in the estate should be and how 
that, how that property is to be distributed. 
Okay. Do you want to, the three of you want to 
meet and see if you can come to some resolution? Is there 
someone else who has an interest? 
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FEMALE SPEAKER: Yes. This lady and gentleman 
right here have a Will also. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Why don't all of you get 
together then. Do you have, do you have another Will? 
MALE SPEAKER: Just a second, I'm looking at it. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Anybody else got a Will? 
Okay. Well, I don't know if this is a Will but it looks 
like it's a more of giving them permission during his 
lifetime to use certain items of property. He does refer to 
another document. 
Are you John and Sherry Hernandez? Is that— 
FEMALE SPEAKER: (Short inaudible, no mic). 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Did he have, did he have real 
property in Delta? Did he own a house in Delta? 
MS. HERNANDEZ?: Yes. We're living in it. 
THE JUDGE: You're living in it? And did he give 
you a deed to it? 
MS. HERNANDEZ?: We're on the deed with Mary. 
THE JUDGE: He owned the deed with Mary? Okay. 
So that really isn't part of his estate. Is that correct, 
Ms. Fenley? 
MS. FENLEY: Correct. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MS. PLUFF?: The Will I claim is only about his 
pseronal possessions. 
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THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MALE SPEAKER: Is that the will Dated December 11th 
or— 
THE JUDGE: Yes, December 11th. 
MALE SPEAKER: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: Well, what I'm going to suggest the 
three of you meet and see if you can agree that somebody be 
appointed, if someone can, who should be appointed as 
personal representative. If you can't then I'll make a 
determination and then we'll, we might discuss a possible 
distribution of his estate too. Because they, the daughters 
would clearly be heirs to, to his estate. Okay? Go in the, 
go in the conference room and a, then we'll just pass your 
case for a while. 
(Discussion of other cases). 
THE JUDGE: Going back to the a, the Tolle 
estate. I asked that the parties involved go and, and try 
to see if they could work out an agreement. Have you had any 
success? 
MS. PLUFF?: Yes. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MS. PLUFF?: We decided that Christina is going to 
be the executor. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. So Christina Garcia. 
MS. PLUFF?: She had to go to the bathroom. 
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THE JUDGE: Okay. Will be appointed as personal 
|| representative over the estate of Mr. Tolle. And was there 
3 II any further agreement as to the division of the estate? 
4 MS. PLUFF?: She said that once she got everything 
5 situated and found out how much it was worth to sell it and 
6 split it between the three of us. 
7 THE JUDGE: That is your agreement, Ms. Fenley? 
8 MS. FENLEY: Yes, that would be fine. 
9 THE JUDGE: And that's your agreement, 
10 Ms. Pluff? 
11 MS. PLUFF: Yes. 
12 THE JUDGE: Okay. Ms. Garcia, and it is agreed 
13 indicated that you will take upon yourself the responsibility 
14 of being the personal representative over your father's 
15 estate. Is that correct? 
16 MS. GARCIA: Yes. 
17 THE JUDGE: And do you understand that includes 
18 preparing an inventory of the assets of the estate and then 
19 selling those assets and, and the agreement is is that you 
20 divide the proceeds equally among the three of you. Is that 
21 correct? 
22 MS. GARCIA: Yes. 
23 THE JUDGE: Okay. Thank you. 
24 MS. FENLEY: Thank you. 
25 WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded. 
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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 
(December 9, 2004) 
THE JUDGE: Okay. You may be seated. Okay. 
We'll call the matter In the Matter of the Estate of Robert 
L. Tolle. This is before the court on a petition for the 
removal of personal representative for cause and for the 
appointment of a successor personal representative. This is 
on the petition of Jeanne Tolle. And Mr. Parkinson is here 
representing the petitioner and the petitioner is present. 
Is there anyone appearing, objecting to the 
petition? Ms. Fenley? 
MS. FENLEY: Yes. 
THE JUDGE: And what's your basis for objection? 
MS. FENLEY: I do not believe that Jeanne Tolle 
should be a personal representative. She pulled out of the 
probate at the first and because she said she couldn't sue 
the estate and be an heir also. And as soon as Christina was 
appointed personal representative then she sued her in 
Florida and Christina was afraid to do anything. She hasn't 
had a chance to really do anything on the probate because 
that case in Florida was not settled until September 24th. 
And I don't believe that the probate should be, have anything 
done to it at this point. I don't believe it— 
THE JUDGE: Well, Mr. Parkinson, I, since Jeanne 
Tolle is the major creditor of the estate how can she serve 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
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as the personal representative? 
MR. PARKINSON: The priority for appointments 
includes allowing any person or including a creditor. 
THE JUDGE: It does, it does include a creditor. 
MR. PARKINSON: It assumes that, our probate 
system assumes that a creditor can be the personal 
representative. She's both a creditor and has a higher 
priority as an heir— 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. PARKINSON: — in this case. And in this 
case nothing has occurred. There isn't been a notice to 
creditors, that's something that could have occurred with or 
without that. We made our claim, Jeanne Tolle made her 
claim on the estate. There's been no response to that. 
"There's been no inventory. All that's happened is that 
Ms. Garcia came out and took some things out of his home. . 
And there has been, there's nothing in the court records that 
shows her doing anything in this. And we understand she may 
have been limited as to what she could do with this pending 
problem. But she has done nothing and she's filed nothing 
with the court objecting to this today. 
THE JUDGE: Well, she's filed this, if you want to 
review. 
MR. PARKINSON: Oh, all right. 
MS. FENLEY: Would you read it out loud, please? 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
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THE JUDGE: It would be... Why don't you read it 
out loud so that Ms. Fenley can— 
MR. PARKINSON: All right. 
THE JUDGE: This is a, you know I, I assume that 
she only received this notice of probate proceedings that was 
sent out. It doesn't really say what this is, the notice 
doesn't really say. So I assume you've had some 
communications with her, Ms. Fenley, because— 
MS. FENLEY: No, I haven't for some time. 
THE JUDGE: It appears that what she's objecting 
to is your appointment as personal representative rather 
than, so I don't know if she assumes that... 
Why don't you read it out loud. 
MR. PARKINSON: Okay. 
Attention Honorable Judge Donald J. 
Eyre, 
I, Christina Aquino-Garcia, do not 
think Mary Fenley should be able to be 
the power of attorney for a counsel of 
reasons. 
Reason one, she told me that somebody 
had stole must of his stuff from house. 
She also took possession of everything 
she wanted like his big Craftsman 
toolbox, his truck and his oxygen tanks 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
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and stuff, I don't remember. 
Reason two, she told me that the houses 
and the land is not included what is to 
be in, in what is to be sold because she 
put them in her name. 
I thought you said all Wills were 
thrown out and they were included. 
Without the houses and the land he 
doesn't own anything of value besides 
three vehicles. 
Reason three, I was recently sued for 
his estate in the amount of $1,700,000 in 
Florida by his other daughter Jeanne 
Tolle and Mary Fenley knows because I 
told her. I also told her that nothing 
could be touched because of it. 
I called as soon as I found out we had 
court but it was too late to change the 
date because I just found out the 5th of 
this month. 
At the last court date I was under the 
impression the houses and the land were 
part of the estate that I was supposed to 
sell. Could you straighten that out for 
me to understand. If they are not part 
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of the estate there is nothing left from 
what Mary Fenley told me to be power of 
attorney over. 
Thank you. 
So my answer is no she should not be 
power of attorney. 
And then there was a page apparently before that 
that said, 
I, Priscilla Pluff, do not agree with 
Mary Fenley becoming power of attorney of 
Robert L. Tolle's estate. I want 
Christina Aquino-Garcia to stay power of 
attorney. I do not trust Mary. Also 
Christina has a $1,000,000 lawsuit 
against her over our father's estate. 
Thank you. Priscilla Pluff. 
THE JUDGE: Well, it appears that that, just from 
my reading of that it appears that she doesn't, didn't 
understand that it was Jeanne Tolle that was requesting to be 
the substitute. I guess maybe they thought it was 
Ms. Fenley who was making that request. 
MS. FENLEY: Your Honor, is it possible to 
schedule a hearing when Christina could be advised, Priscilla 
could be advised. And I would like a copy of those 
letters. 
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THE JUDGE: You can get copies today. 
MR. PARKINSON: Your Honor, if I may respond to 
that. That's what this was and, and there was a notice under 
the statute. She acknowledges in the letter that she hasn't 
done anything. And we have someone with a, with priority 
here who's willing to serve and will do the duties of the 
personal representative, and she should be appointed. 
MS. FENLEY: Your Honor, the only Will in 
existence was given to me. And when we had the last hearing 
when Christina was appointed we mediated that. And Christina 
really hasn't had time to do anything. And as far as the 
properties, that was discussed at that time too, the last 
time. I don't think the probate should go ahead, anything 
be done until my appeal goes through. 
THE JUDGE: Well, what I'm going to do, I'm going 
to make, I'm going to, this has been an informal probate as I 
recall. I'm going to make this a formal probate. I'm going 
to appoint... Clearly at this point in time Jeanne Tolle has 
two priorities, she is a substantial creditor of the estate 
and also she's an heir. What that means, Ms. Fenley, is 
that Ms. Tolle, Jeanne Tolle cannot do anything without, 
cannot sell any property or dispose of anything without 
formal approval of the court. So a— 
MS. FENLEY: Your Honor, what about all the things 
that Jeanne took from the house? 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
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THE JUDGE: Well, you can a file a, file any 
pleadings that you think would be appropriate if you think 
that she has. You a... And I'm going to direct Jeanne 
Tolle to do those things, I'm going to direct her 
specifically to do two things immediately, one is to give 
notice to creditors and one is to make an inventory of the 
estate. And, and once that inventory is, is filed, 
Ms. Fenley, you may determine if there's things that you are 
aware of that should be included in the estate that are not 
there then you may a, make objection to the inventory. 
Also, since we have you here, Ms. Fenley, I do have 
the other case, the case of Jeanne Tolle versus you and, and 
those other parties. Mr. Parkinson had prepared an order 
pursuant to the Court's ruling in this case. I note that you 
filed a one sentence objection which says "We are sorry we 
cannot approve your order as written". 
Is there anything specifically in that order that 
does not conform with the, the ruling of the Court that you 
want to make objection to? 
MS. FENLEY: There wasn't anything in there that I 
could not object to. If you will read it to me I will tell 
you item by item. 
THE JUDGE: Well that was your, that was your 
responsibility. In my reading of it it appears to comport 
with the decision of the Court wherein I overturned the 
COURT PROCRRnTiNjn.q 
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transfers that were made by a, by Mr. Tolle prior to his, 
prior to his death which the Court found to be in violation 
of the interest of, of her, of his creditors. 
Is there anything specifically that you can recall 
that Mr. Parkinson's proposed order is in opposition to the 
ruling of the Court? I understand that you do not agree 
with the ruling of the Court and you've filed a notice of 
appeal. But is there anything in, in the proposed order 
that does not comport with the, with the decision the Court 
made? 
MS. FENLEY: I don't remember the wording of 
that order. But I, I don't believe anything should be done 
with the properties until my appeal has been heard by— 
THE JUDGE: Well all, all— 
MS. FENLEY: — by the other court. 
THE JUDGE: All Mr. Parkinson's order does is that 
it reverses the, the transfers that, the deeds that Mr. Tolle 
made to, to you and to his brother and puts the, puts the 
property back in the estate's name. And so it doesn't put 
it in Ms., in Jeanne Tolle's name, it puts it in the name of 
the estate. And I've, and I've just ordered that, that that 
property is not to be disposed of unless there's prior court 
order. 
MR. FENLEY: Well, we're appealing the reversal of 
the transfers and— 
("•nriDTI D D r t n D T j n T w n n 
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THE JUDGE: I understand that. But until that 
appeal, until the court rules upon it, the Court's decision 
stands. 
Okay. Well, I'm going to sign the proposed 
order—: 
MS. FENLEY: Your Honor, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Did you have something, Ms. Fenley? 
MS. FENLEY: Okay. I just had a question. 
THE JUDGE: Go ahead. 
MS. FENLEY: Why was the transfer illegal when the 
taking of the money out of the bank was not? What was the 
difference there? 
THE JUDGE: Well, you didn't file a counterclaim 
or anything. That wasn't before me. It might be that it 
was illegal but that wasn't, that wasn't the decision that 
was before me. That wasn't what... You hadn't filed any, 
any action against Ms. Jeanne Tolle to try to bring that back 
into the estate. 
MS. FENLEY: Can I do that now? 
THE JUDGE: Well, I'm not here to give you legal 
advice. I suggest that you consult with an attorney. 
I'm going to sign the proposed order. 
MS. FENLEY: Your Honor, one more question, 
please. 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
rnriRT PRnrERDTM^Q 
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MS. FENLEY: Does that mean since it's back in 
the estate, does that mean that she is going to be paying 
the taxes and do the roofing and all of the stuff and 
determine— 
THE JUDGE: Whoever is the personal representative 
of the estate, and I've just appointed her to be that, has 
those obligations. Okay? 
MR. PARKINSON: Your Honor, I have here an order 
for removal of personal representative and appointment of 
successor personal representative. There are a couple of 
additional matters that you added to that, specifically 
reguiring that this is a formal probate which I agree with, 
we need to do this at formal probate at this time. We can 
either add that in by interlineation or I can submit a 
supplemental order. 
THE JUDGE: Why don't you submit a supplemental 
one. 
MR. PARKINSON: Okay. I'm willing to do that. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Anything else that needs to be 
taken up at this time? 
MR. PARKINSON: Nothing further. 
THE JUDGE: Did you have anything else, 
Ms. Fenley? 
MS. FENLEY: If Jeanne is the personal 
representative does that mean everything gets split five 
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ways, or she pays herself 1.7-million and then whatever is 
left over is split among the other heirs? 
THE JUDGE: Well, again I'm not here to give legal 
advice and that's a matter that's not before me. Okay? 
Okay. 
MR. PARKINSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: If you want copies of those things 
filed by the a, Ms. Garcia, you can take that file and the 
clerk can make copies for you, Ms. Fenley. 
MR. PARKINSON: I would like a copy as well, Your 
Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION 
) 
) SS. 
) 
I, Penny C. Abbott, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and 
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify 
that I received the electronically recorded tape #2 in the 
matter of Estate of Robert L. Tolle, hearing date December 9, 
2004, and that I transcribed it into typewriting and that a 
full, true and correct transcription of said hearing so 
recorded and transcribed is set forth in the foregoing pages 
numbered 1 through 14, inclusive except where it is indicated 
that the tape recording was inaudible. 
WITNESS my hand and official seal this 9th day of April, 
2005. 
PENNY C. AJSB0TT, COURT REPORTER/NOTARY 
License 2(g/l 02811-7801 
Notary Public, Comm Exp 9-24-08 
PENNY C ABBOTT 
^ NOTARY PUB! 
SAL 
COM*' 
POTTPT ppnPTTTrnTKmQ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
